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Abstract: Wage mobility among low wage earners has previously been focussing on the 
characteristics of the low wage earners, whereas the role of the firm has been neglected. The 
purpose of this study is to focus on the characteristics of the firms when analysing variation in 
wage mobility. The empirical findings confirm that the characteristics of the employing firm 
indeed matter for low-wage employees´ likelihood of escaping a low-wage job. Especially does 
the employing firm affect the destination state – i.e. where a low-wage worker goes after having 
finished a low-wage job, and the findings enable me to identify three types of firms: career firms 
with high within-firm upward wage mobility, stepping-stone firms with high between-firm 
upward wage mobility and dead-end firms with low upward wage mobility. 
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1. Introduction 
The issue of working poor, i.e. workers with an income below a threshold ensuring a certain 
standard of living, has been a concern in the US for a number of decades (see e.g. Wachtel and 
Betsey (1972) or Gittleman and Joyce (1999)). The widening of the wage distribution in most 
OECD countries has increased the number of working poor or low-wage workers in the 
European countries (see Gottshalk and Smeeding (1997) for a survey on selected OECD 
countries and Andersen (2003) for a study on changes in Danish wages during the 1990s). 
Therefore, the issue on low-wage workers has received increased interest during the last decade 
in European labour research as well. The number of low-wage earners is not, however, in itself 
necessarily a cause for concern. If low-paid jobs are jobs everybody possesses as transitory 
occupations and as part of the general labour market, then the effect of a low-wage job on 
lifetime earnings will be small and the disutility minimal. However, if low-paid jobs are dead-
end jobs for a group of low-wage workers, these workers will be marginalized in income and 
hence their jobs will be considered as bad jobs. Thus, wage mobility for low-wage earners is a 
key question in welfare research, and many studies in Europe as well as in the US have 
addressed this issue (see e.g. Smith and Vavrichek (1992), Gregory and Elias (1994), Bazen 
(2001), Stewart and Swaffield (1998), Cappellari (2002) and Asplund et al. (1998)). The main 
findings of this literature indicate that for a vast majority low pay is a transitory state; within 5-
10 years most low-paid workers have moved up the earnings ladder. It is furthermore found that 
mobility out of low wage is higher for young workers and highly educated individuals, whereas 
the gender effect differs between the different countries of study. 
So far, the issue on low wage and low-wage mobility has only been focusing on the supply side 
of the labour market and typically concentrated on the continuously employed, i.e. the effects of 
individual characteristics on the probability of moving from low-wage to high-wage have caught 
the interest of researchers. However, wage mobility is not just a concern of the workers. Firms 
may more or less deliberately choose a certain policy on wages and wage mobility. It is most 
likely that firms with different characteristics will apply different policies concerning this issue, 
either due to different production methods, different firm size, different business strategies etc. 
(see Hachen (1992) and Haveman and Coven (1994)). Thus, not only who a low-wage worker is, 
but also where he is employed can affect his chance of escaping low wage.    3
To my knowledge, a recent paper by Andersson et al. (2002) is the only paper dealing with both 
the supply and demand side of low-wage mobility. Their study is carried out on US data, and 
they find, among other things, that job and industry changes increase the escape rates out of low 
wage; that wage increases for low-wage men occur within the traditional industries, while they 
occur within the service industries for women; and that larger firms are better places to escape 
low wage by staying - not by changing firm.  
The aim of this paper is to investigate the simultaneous impact of firm and individual 
characteristics on low-wage individuals’ transitions out of low wage; i.e., what are the 
characteristics of firms with a low upward mobility in wages compared to firms with high 
mobility, when keeping the individual effects constant? Can low-wage jobs at some firms be 
seen as a good qualification for high-wage jobs at other firms, while low-wage jobs at other 
firms are more likely to lead to unemployment?  
This paper contributes to the present literature on low-wage workers and wage mobility in a 
number of aspects. First of all, as mentioned above, firm-specific characteristics are taken into 
account in analysing the probability of escaping low wage. The inclusion of both individual and 
firm characteristics helps avoiding the selection bias problem due to different people being 
employed in different firms. It also allows me to examine, if and how the employing firms affect 
the transitions out of low-wage jobs, for two similar workers.  
The firm-specific information available consists not only of size and industry code of the firm, 
but also geographic location and various aspects of the labour force composition of the firm. 
Hence, the analysis contributes in terms of the rich detail of the data. Furthermore, unlike the 
year-to-year transitions applied by many of the previous studies, I apply a duration model. The 
advantages of the duration model are, among others, that it makes it possible to account for 
right-censored spells to estimate the duration dependence and to correct for unobserved 
heterogeneity. Finally, the data allow me to define the unit of the analysis as a low-wage job, i.e. 
a low-wage spell within the same firm. This feature enables me to investigate where low-wage 
employees go after ending a low-wage job, distinguishing between high-wage stayers, high-
wage movers and low-wage movers.  
In Section 2, I present the data used in the empirical part, in Section 3 I present descriptive and 
econometric estimation results regarding low-wage firms, in Section 4 low-wage job spells are 
defined and descriptive statistics are presented, in Section 5 I briefly describe the duration model   4
applied in the analysis and the results are presented, and finally Section 6 closes the paper with a 
summary and conclusion. 
 
2. Data 
Data consist of an employer-employee data set from Statistics Denmark. I use a 5% sample of all 
persons in Denmark who have been employed in the private sector at any time between 1980 and 
1999. These individuals are followed in any labour market state they have experienced during 
the observation period, 1980-2000. The individuals are restricted to the age 25 to 65 in order to 
exclude pre-students, apprentices and pensioners with a wage job. On the employer side, only 
firms in the private sector with more than three employees in each of the years they are present 
in the data are included.  
Following e.g. Gregory and Elias (1994), I define low wage as the lowest quintiles of the hourly 
wage distribution measured each year. Thus, low wage is defined as a relative measure. Hourly 
wage is calculated as total labour income divided by number of working hours in the year. I have 
chosen to apply the hourly wage, since I find this earnings variable to be closest to the decision 
of the firm and therefore the best measure for my purpose.  
Besides a range of individual characteristics such as age, family status, gender, income, 
experience etc., the labour market state of the individual and the identification of a potential 
employer are known for each year at the end of November. These data are merged with 
information about the employers: firm/plant size, industry code, firm/plant location, labour 
composition etc. Finally, information on the job levels is available. This gives me a unique data 
set both in terms of the length of the observation period, the size of the sample and the detailed 
variable information. Merging the employer and employee sides allows me to characterise the 
workforce at each firm. 
I have information on wage income on a yearly basis as measured by the end of November. 
Thus, it is only possible to define a person’s labour market state for an entire year, and 
consequently some information is lost. If a person, for instance, experiences a couple of months 
of unemployment during summer, this will not be taken into account. However, to make sure 
that individuals are not defined as employed during the entire year merely because they are 
employed in November, individuals with a yearly employment rate less than 50% are defined as   5
being out of employment no matter what their state in November is. Likewise, individuals with a 
zero hourly wage rate are defined as being out of employment.  
 
3. Low-wage firms 
In this section, I look at the characteristics of low-wage firms, i.e. firms with a high fraction of 
low-wage employees. Since low wage is defined as a relative measure consisting of the two 
lowest deciles of the hourly wage distribution, an equal distribution of low-wage earners across 
all firms would imply a share of 20% low-wage earners within each firm. In Table 3.1, the 
distribution of the average share of low-wage employees across firms is shown. It is seen that the 
low-wage employees are quite unevenly distributed among the firms. Nearly 10% of the firms 
have had no low-wage employees during the entire observation period, whereas in about 3% of 
the firms 90-100% of the employees were low-wage workers. The distribution of the share of 
low-wage employees differs by characteristics of the firm. E.g., the distribution narrows with 
increasing firm size. This is, of course, mainly due to the fact that more observations are used 
when calculating the distribution for large firms. However, we also see that the median share of 
low-wage employees is decreasing with firm size, i.e., for small firms it is 0.2-0.3, for medium-
sized firms it is 0.1-0.2 and for large firms it is less than 0.1. For the share of female employees, 
I find that firms with few females are more likely to have no low-wage employees, and among 
these firms no firm has more than 70% low-wage employees on average. On the other hand, 
among firms with a high share of females, more than 10% have 70% or more low-wage 
employees on average. Likewise, firms with a low average education level among their 
employees have a high low-wage employees share. Thus, 25% of these firms have more low-
wage than high-wage employees. This is only true for 12% of the high-education firms.    6
Table 3.1. Distribution of firms, by average share of low-wage employees. 
Average share of low-wage employees for the period 1980-2000
1) 
%  All  Firm size  Rate of female  Average education 
    4-20  21-100  >100  <30 %  30-70% >70%  <12 years >12 years
0 9.1 10.2  1.6 0.3 12.0 5.7 6.6 2.1 3.5
(0-0.1] 13.8 10.8  32.1 60.2 16.4 12.6 7.2 17.7 23.6
(0.1-0.2] 16.7 15.2  28.1 23.4 17.9 16.0 13.9 18.7 25.9
(0.2-0.3] 17.4 17.7  16.3 7.0 18.3 15.1 19.6 14.9 20.2
(0.3-0.4] 10.6 11.0  8.9 3.9 9.9 11.2 12.0 12.4 13.8
(0.4-0.5] 12.1 13.1  5.4 2.4 10.4 12.6 17.2 10.7 7.6
(0.5-0.6] 5.1 5.3  3.7 1.4 3.3 7.1 6.6 8.3 3.2
(0.6-0.7] 5.1 5.6  2.1 0.6 3.4 7.5 6.0 6.5 1.5
(0.7-0.8] 4.7 5.2  0.9 0.3 0 3.7 5.6 6.0 4.3
(0.8-0.9] 2.6 2.8  0.5 0.2 0 1.9 3.7 2.1 2.8
(0.9-1] 2.9 3.2  0.3 0.4 0 2.9 2.9 2.8 1.6
Total 100 100  100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Note: Private-sector firms with at least four employees. 
1)  It is an unbalanced panel, so not all firms are present in the sample for the entire period. 
 
 
To characterize low-wage firms further, I estimate a model of the share of low-wage employees 
in the firms on a set of firm characteristics. Since the dependent variable is limited from zero to 
one with the lower bound binding, an ordinary and a random effect Tobit model is applied. Thus, 
the observed fraction of low-wage employees at time t within firm j, yjt
*, is a realisation of the 
latent variable yjt,  
*
0 for  0
where   for  0 1












The fraction of low-wage workers is explained by a vector of firm characteristics, Zj, such that: 
',   jt j jt jt y α βε =+ + Z  
where  j α α =  in the ordinary model, and 
2 ,~ ( 0 , ) jj j Gaussian υ α αυυ σ =+  in the random 
effect model. 
The estimation results are shown in Table 3.2. In general, there is no big difference between the 
results in the two models, but the likelihood ratio test (LR-test) testing the significance of the 
random effects implies that the within-panel variance component is significant different from 
zero, and thus the random effect model is preferable.    7
Table 3.2. Dependent variable: share of low-wage employees in the firm. 
  Tobit  Random effect Tobit 
  Coefficient Std. Err.  Coefficient  Std. Err. 
Labour force composition inside firm:           
Mean education (years)  -0,013* 0,000  -0,025*  0,000 
Mean age (years)  -0,011* 0,000  -0,009*  0,000 
Mean experience (years)  -0,008* 0,000  -0,004*  0,000 
Mean proportion inside firms of:        
  Employees with firm tenure >10 y.   0,057* 0,002  0,050*  0,001 
  New employees (1 year tenure)  -0,018* 0,001  -0,014*  0,001 
  Managerial employees  -0,206* 0,002  -0,141*  0,002 
  Females  0,150* 0,001  0,089*  0,001 
  On sick leave  0,319* 0,001  0,214*  0,001 
< 20 employees   0,036* 0,003  0,021*  0,005 
20-100 employees  0,011* 0,003  0,016*  0,005 
100-500 employees  -0,014* 0,004  0,002  0,005 
> 500 employees  ref.    ref.   
Primary sector  -0,011* 0,001  -0,023*  0,002 
Manufacturing   -0,015* 0,001  -0,053*  0,002 
Retail trade  0,062* 0,001  0,035*  0,002 
Transportation -0,076* 0,001  -0,106*  0,002 
Finance -0,025* 0,001  -0,038*  0,002 
Service sector  ref.    ref.   
Constant 0,747* 0,005  0,851*  0,006 
LR-test (υj=0)  Chi
2(01)= 4.0e+05,  Prob>= Chi
2(01) = 0.000 
Note: * indicates parameter estimates significantly different from zero at a 5% level.  
Private-sector firms with at least four employees. 
 
 
Not surprisingly, I find that to a large extent the labour force composition inside firms with 
relatively many low-wage employees corresponds to the typical low-wage workers. Thus, the 
average age, average levels of education and work experience among the employees as well as 
the share of managers decrease the share of low-wage workers. Likewise, firms with relatively 
many women and employees on sick leave have more low-wage employees.  Furthermore, the 
typical low-wage firm is a small or medium-sized firm (less than 100 employees) in the service 
or retail trade sector (including hotels and restaurants). Rather surprisingly, I find that low-wage 
firms typically have a low turnover, i.e. they have many long-tenured employees and few new 
employees. Several factors can give rise to this result. First, there might be a trade-off between 
wage and job security, so that in return for the low wages these firms offer stable jobs. Second, it 
might also be the case that these low-wage firms are no stepping-stones, i.e. employees in these   8
firms do not receive any better job offers, so they might as well stay.
1 Moreover, the low-wage 
firms are not attractive to new employees, which explains the negative effect on the rate of new 
employees. So the inflow to low-wage firms is low, as is the outflow. 
4. Low-wage job spells 
I have chosen low-wage job spells as the unit of the analysis in the duration model. This 
approach has several advantages; in the duration model the longitudinal feature of the data can 
be exploited, and moreover this model is especially well suited for analyses focusing on a 
specific state, such as the low-wage state. Using the low-wage job as the unit of analysis enables 
me to focus on the effect of a job. Usually, low-wage mobility studies do not take job or 
employer changes into account when analysing mobility out of low-wage.
2 However, a change 
in the wage is one of the most apparent adjustments occurring as a result of a job change, and it 
therefore seems natural to include it directly in the analysis.  
A low-wage job spell is defined as the time a person spends in low wage within the same firm.
3 
This approach gives me the opportunity to distinguish between continuing in high wage in the 
same firm (high-wage stayer) or in a new firm (high-wage mover), continuing in low wage at 
another firm (low-wage mover) or leaving employment. To understand the role of the firm, it is 
important to know what kind of jobs are stepping-stones to higher-wage jobs at other firms, and 
what kind of jobs lead to other low-wage jobs or unemployment – analysing dead-end jobs is not 
only a concern of upward wage mobility inside the firm, the alternative options outside the firm 
are just as important. However, to account for stigmatisation from low wage in general, I include 
the duration of past low wage as an explanatory variable, in the case where the individual comes 
from a low-wage job in another firm.  
Hence, each spell of low-paid jobs in a firm has transition possibilities l=hs, hn, ln or o, defined 
as:  
hs:  high-wage job in the same firm 
hn:  high-wage job in a new firm 
ln:  low-wage job in a new firm 
o:  out of employment (entrepreneurship, unemployment or out of the labour market) 
                                                 
1 This issue is investigated further in the duration analysis part. 
2 To my knowledge, the only exceptions are Andersson et al. (2002, 2003). 
3 Note, a person might change job tasks during a low-wage job spell; the low-wage job definition is only affected by 
wage and employer changes.    9
The low-wage job spells may be uncompleted, i.e. censored, at the end of the observation period. 
Only low-wage jobs occupied by wage earners in the private sector are included, but information 
on self- and public employment is used for defining the destination states. 
In order to avoid people moving in and out of low pay merely because of minor changes in the 
relative low-wage threshold, a wage-buffer is included. That is, for an employee to enter the 
low-wage state, the hourly wage must decrease below the 20th percentile of the hourly wage 
distribution, and it needs to increase above the 30th percentile for him to leave low wage again. 
Thus, each low-wage job spell ends by the individual either receiving a wage above the 30
th 
percentile of the hourly wage distribution, or leaving the job (see Figure 4.1). 
Figure 4.1. Definition of low-wage job spells. Person with three spells within two different firms. 
 
I include all low-wage job spells in the sample beginning during the period 1981-1999. Labour 
market information for year 2000 is only used for determining the destination states for spells 
ending in 1999, thus the maximum duration of a low-wage job spell is 19 years. Applying these 
restrictions, I end up with a data set consisting of 55,440 low-wage job spells distributed on 
37,732 different individuals employed in 24,864 different firms. 
Next, I focus on the mean duration and distribution of the low-wage jobs. The figures are 
divided by the subsequent labour market states (destination states) and shown in Columns 1-3 in 
Table 4.1. About 35% of the low-wage job spells end by the individual moving to a higher-wage 










Time   10
job, either in the same firm (25%) or in a new firm (10%), and nearly 20% continue in a low-
wage job with a new employer. About 35% leave low wage by leaving employment; 25% to 
unemployment, 8% leaving the labour force and about 2% become self-employed. Finally, 12% 
of the low-wage job spells were still in progress at the end of the observation period. 
 
Table 4.1. Mean duration of low-wage job spells (1
st quintile) by destination states. 












Higher wage same 
firm   24.8 2.3  1.9 
36.5 1.8      1.5 
Higher wage new firm  10.6  1.8  1.4  11.5  1.6    1.2 
Low wage new firm  17.9  2.2  2.0  11.3  2.0    1.8 
Entrepreneurship 1.7  2.0 1.7  1.6  1.9      1.7 
Unemployment 25.1  2.0  1.7  22.7  1.8      1.6 
Out of labour force*  7.7  2.2  2.1  7.2  2.0    2.0 
Uncompleted 12.2  4.0  2.9  9.2  3.6      2.7 
All 100.0  2.3  2.1  100.0 2.0      1.8 
* Education, pension and other leave schemes.  
 
 
The average durations of the completed low-wage jobs vary between 1.8 and 2.3 years, 
indicating that low-wage jobs in general are short. Comparing the average durations between 
destination states, we note that the average duration of low-wage job spells is about half a year 
longer for transitions to higher wage in the same firm compared to higher wage in a new firm. 
Thus, it seems as if transitions to higher-wage jobs at other firms are reached faster than higher-
wage jobs within the same firm. It should, however, be emphasised that the differences in mean 
durations are not significant as the standard deviations indicate.  
To establish how the mean duration and distribution by destination state of low-wage jobs are 
affected by the definition of low wage, these values are presented for low wage ending at the 
20
th percentile (Columns 4-6 in Table 4.1). The most striking difference between the two is the 
fact that more low-wage earners leave for higher wage in the same firm in the case with no wage 
buffer. This clearly indicates that a large amount of those escaping the 1
st quintile within the 
same firm do not manage to escape the 30
th percentile but fluctuate around the low-wage 
threshold. Obviously, the average duration of a low-wage job is increased when the wage buffer 
is included.   11
As mentioned above, the current paper focuses on low-wage job spells and not low-wage spells 
as in the previous literature. To compare the two spell definitions, the average duration and 
distribution of the spells as well as the average number of firms within each low-wage spell are 
presented in Table 4.2. As expected, the average duration of a low-wage spell is longer than the 
average duration of a low-wage job, although by less than half a year. Note also, that the 
percentage of uncompleted spells is higher for the low-wage spells, which increases the 
downward bias on the average duration. As regards the number of firms per low-wage spell, 
individuals leaving low wage by leaving employment, compared to other low-wage employees, 
have on average worked in more firms within the low-wage spell. However, the difference is not 
significant (standard deviations around 0.5). 
 
Table 4.2. Mean durations of low-wage job spells and low-wage spells by destination states. 
 
 
Next, I divide the low-wage job spells into groups by size and industry of the firm (see Tables 
4.3 and 4.4). I find that the distribution of destination states varies considerably between the 
different types of firms. The number of transitions to higher wage in the same firm increases 
with the size of the firm, whereas the number of transitions to higher wage in a new firm 
decreases. The number of transitions out of employment decreases with the size of the firm, 
while the number of uncompleted spells increases with the size of the firm. 
 
Destination state  Low-wage job spells  Low-wage spells 
 
Distribution Duration  Distribution  Duration 
No. firms 
pr. spell 
Higher wage same firm   24.8  2.3  28.7  2.6  1.16 
Higher wage new firm  10.6  1.8  12.1  2.0  1.15 
Low wage new firm  17.9  2.2  --  --  -- 
Out of employment  34.5  2.0  40.5  2.3  1.26 
Uncompleted 12.2  4.0  18.7  4.5  1.16 
All   2.3  100.0  2.7  1.17 
No. of spells  55,440  48,339   12
Table 4.3. Distribution of destination states by firm size. 
  Number of employees 
Destination state  4-20 21-100 101-500 >500
Higher wage same firm   20.8 24.5 29.2 27.3
Higher wage new firm  12.7 11.3 9.6 8.0
Low wage new firm  16.7 18.2 15.4 21.0
Out of employment  38.8 35.0 32.3 29.7
Uncompleted 11.0 11.1 13.5 14.1
Number of spells  46,340 37,107 22,882 31,245
 
The distribution of destination states is also affected by the industry of the firm. About 28% of 
the low-wage jobs in the manufacturing sector end with higher wage in the same firm, whereas 
only 18% of the low-wage jobs in the primary sectors do. In the primary sector, there is a high 
rate of low-wage employees leaving employment (nearly 45%), whereas in the transport sector a 
large percentage move on to another low-wage job (26%).  
 
Table 4.4. Distribution of destination states by industry. 
  Industry 
Destination state  Primary Manufacturing Trade Transport Finance Service
Higher wage same firm   18.48 27.98 20.12 22.03 32.39 21.5
Higher wage new firm  10.45 10.7 10.41 11.85 11.5 7.28
Low wage new firm  14.74 15.19 19.52 26.38 16.84 18.35
Out of employment  44.43 34.1 37.52 27.22 29.63 35.8
Uncompleted 11.9 12.04 12.42 12.52 9.64 17.07
Number of spells  3,903 41,676 44,199 13,583 17,026 7,573
 
 
The tables above clearly indicate that the mobility out of low-wage jobs is affected by firm 
characteristics. However, these raw figures do not account for the individual characteristics, and 
thus the differences in transitions out of low wage might be due to differences in the workforce 
composition within each firm category. Therefore, I now apply a parametric duration model, 
which accounts for both individual and firm characteristics. 
5.  The duration analysis 
Because the data is grouped into yearly observations, a grouped duration model specification is 
suitable for this application with the duration time divided into K one-year intervals, (0, t1], (t1, 
t2], ...(tK-1, tK] (see e.g. Lancaster (1990) for a comprehensive introduction to duration models). I   13
apply a mixed proportional competing risk hazard specification with a stepwise constant baseline 
hazard, and with firm-specific observable covariates, Zj(t), individual-/job-specific observable 





() , ( | ( ), ( )) exp( ( ) ( ) ),       ( ) 1, 2,... li j il j l n k l i l hk k k k k v n k m βγ β ′′ =+ + = XZ X + Z  
where h(⋅) is the interval-specific hazard function out of low-paid jobs for person i in firm j, and 
l = hs, hn, ln, o indicates the four destination states. One interesting feature of this specification 
is that it allows me to analyse, whether low-wage workers who move to higher wage in the same 
firm differ from those moving to higher wage in another firm, and similarly do the employing 
firms differ. Moreover, I do not have to condition on continuous employment when applying this 
type of model. The model is estimated for the entire sample and for sub-samples according to 
gender and educational level. The results are shown in Tables 5.2-5.4 
The duration dependence, i.e. the dependence between the conditional probability of ending a 
low-wage job spell and the time already spent in the current low-wage job, is shown in Figure 
5.1. The adoption of a competing risk hazard specification implies that the conditional 
probability of ending a low-wage job spell depends on how the individual leaves low wage (by 
high wage in the same firm, high wage in a new firm, low wage in a new firm or by leaving 
employment). Thus, the duration dependence is presented for each destination state, separately.    
 
                                                 
4 Ideally, the model should be corrected for firm-specific unobserved heterogeneity simultaneously with the 
individual unobserved heterogeneity. However, this approach is not currently feasible, since it implies individuals 
sharing effects with different individuals during the period of observations, leading to intractable integrations.     14
Figure 5.1. Estimated hazard rates out of low-wage jobs by destination state 
Note: The levels of the hazard rates are calculated for the mean value of the observed explanatory variables. The 
correction for unobserved heterogeneity divides the sample into low- and high-exit individuals, and the estimated 
hazard rates are shown for the low-exit individuals accounting for 62%. 
 
 
Except for transitions to low wage in a new firm, the conditional probability of leaving a low-
wage job increases during the first year and decreases slowly thereafter. Recognising the 
standard deviations for the baseline hazard terms implies, however, that there is no significant 
duration dependence for leaving a low-wage job. Thus low-wage employees do not seem to be 
stigmatised or “locked in” by remaining in the same low-wage job, since their probability of 
leaving the job is not decreasing with the length of the spell. In fact, when estimating the model 
without correcting for unobserved characteristics, I do find negative duration dependence. This 
indicates that when some people are staying longer in a low-wage job, this is not due to the 
duration of the low-wage job itself, but rather because of observed or unobserved characteristics 
of the person or the firm.
5 Some potential duration dependence may, nonetheless, be hidden 
within the first year, since data is grouped on yearly basis.
6  
                                                 
5 Stewart and Swaffield (1999) consider the state dependence of being in low wage. They also find that individual 
heterogeneity is very important; without accounting for endogenous selection into low wage the state dependence is 
overstated by a factor of 2. They do, however, still find significant state dependence also after correcting for 
individual heterogeneity. 
6 Earlier studies on job durations suggest a negative duration dependence during the first months of a job (see e.g. 
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Next, I turn to the parameter estimates of the duration model (see Table 5.1). The effects of the 
individual characteristics do not deviate much from those found in the previous literature. 
Consequently, I will not comment on these. 
The status of the previous labour market spell as well as the duration of a previous low-wage 
spell are included in the model to account for lagged state and duration dependence. With the 
exception of entrants to the labour market, I find that low-wage employees coming from another 
low-wage spell have the lowest likelihood of getting higher wage within the same firm, whereas 
they are the most likely to move to high wage in another firm, as long as the previous low-wage 
spell was not too long. However, this group is also the most likely one to continue in a new low-
wage job. Coming from an out-of-employment state (the reference state) increases the risk of 
leaving employment again. In accordance with the findings of Stewart and Swaffield (1999) and 
Cappellari and Jenkins (2003), this indicates a cycle of low pay and out of employment, but 
since I am not looking at the transition into low pay, I cannot say if individuals outside 
employment have a higher probability of getting a low wage job, too. The length of a latent 
previous low-wage job spell seems to have a small negative effect on the transition to all 
destinations except low wage in a new firm, i.e. the longer a person has been in low wage prior 
to entering the present low-wage job, the longer will the present low-wage spell be.  
I now turn to the effects of job and firm characteristics. Not surprisingly, I find that employees in 
higher-level jobs have a high transition rate to higher wage, whereas employees in low-level jobs 
are more likely to continue in a new low-wage job or even leave employment.    
Two variables describing the labour market conditions are included: the aggregate yearly 
unemployment rate (grouped into three intervals) and the unemployment rate of the municipality 
where the firm is located relative to the aggregate yearly unemployment rate. The purpose of the 
latter variable is to test the effect of the tightness of the local labour market. I find that a higher 
aggregate unemployment rate increases the transition to higher wage in the same firm, but also 
into low-wage jobs at other firms and out of employment. It seems plausible that in periods of 
high unemployment the internal labour market will tend to be stronger, i.e. firms avoid new hires 
and promote from within the firm.  Moreover, due to stronger competition for jobs low-wage 
employees who leave the firm will have to take another low-wage job or even leave 
employment. Concerning the relative unemployment rate, it is found that the transition out of a 
low-wage job is increasing with the relative tightness of the local labour market. Thus, low-wage   16
employees in firms located in high-unemployment municipalities will tend to stay in the same 
low-wage job.  
 
Table 5.1. The competing risk hazard rate out of low-wage jobs. 
  Higher wage 
same firm 
Higher wage  
new firm 
Low wage  
new firm 
Out of  
employment 
Individual characteristics:                
Age 25-30  0.64**  0.05  1.45**  0.09  0.57**  0.05  -0.14**  0,04 
Age 30-40  0.47**  0.04  1.12**  0.08  0.41**  0.04  -0.24**  0,03 
Age 40-50  0.29**  0.03  0.72**  0.08  0.25**  0.04  -0.41**  0,03 
Age > 50  ref.    ref.    ref.    ref.   
Children aged 0-14  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.04  0.00  0.03  0.08**  0,02 
Woman -0.35**  0.03  -0.69**  0.05  0.04*  0.03  0.12**  0,03 
Experience <5 years  -0.48**  0.04  -0.35**  0.07  0.03  0.04  0.43**  0,03 
Experience 5-10 years  -0.13**  0.03  -0.01  0.05  0.05*  0.03  0.21**  0,03 
Experience > 10 years  ref.    ref.    ref.    ref.   
Education <10 years  -0.14**  0.03  -0.09*  0.05  0.05*  0.03  0.19**  0,03 
Education 10-12 years  -0.19**  0.03  -0.15**  0.05  -0.05*  0.03  0.09**  0,03 
Education >12 years  ref.    ref.    ref.    ref.   
Previous labour market state                 
Entrant -0.14**  0.04  -0.10*  0.07  -0.02  0.04  -0.36**  0,04 
Lag status: low wage  -0.07*  0.04  0.16*  0.07  0.20**  0.04  -0.10**  0,04 
Lag status: high wage  0.00  0.03  -0.13*  0.06  -0.10**  0.04  -0.40**  0,03 
Lag status: out of work  ref.    ref.    ref.    ref.   
Lag duration in low wage  -0.03*  0.01  -0.03*  0.02  0.02**  0.01  -0.02*  0,01 
Job characteristics                 
Low level  -0.15**  0.04  -0.22**  0.08  0.20**  0.06  0.10*  0,05 
Medium level  -0.22**  0.04  -0.33**  0.08  0.16**  0.06  -0.02  0,05 
High level  ref.    ref.    ref.    ref.   
Job level unknown  -0.25**  0.06  -0.51**  0.10  0.01  0.07  -0.06  0,06 
Firm characteristics  ref.    ref.    ref.    ref.   
< 20 employees   0.05*  0.03  0.43**  0.06  0.03  0.04  0.29**  0,03 
20-100 employees  0.05*  0.03  0.28**  0.06  0.08**  0.03  0.21**  0,03 
100-500 employees  0.05*  0.03  0.11*  0.06  -0.12**  0.04  0.13**  0,03 
> 500 employees  ref.    ref.    ref.    ref.   
Unempl. <6%  -0.50**  0.05  -0.04  0.08  -0.13**  0.05  -0.60**  0,04 
Unempl. 6-10%  -0.13**  0.03  0.12**  0.05  0.02  0.03  -0.25**  0,03 
Unempl. >10%  ref.    ref.    ref.    ref.   
Relative unempl.  -0.44**  0.06  -0.10  0.10  -0.24**  0.06  -0.39**  0,05 
Primary 0.07  0.10  -0.11  0.17  0.00  0.11  0.25**  0,07 
Manufacturing   0.32**  0.06  0.12  0.11  0.20**  0.06  0.34**  0,05 
Transportation 0.25**  0.07  0.48**  0.12  0.95**  0.07  0.42**  0,06 
Finance 0.38**  0.06  0.31**  0.11  0.27**  0.07  0.19**  0,06 
Trade 0.05  0.06  0.05  0.11  0.26**  0.06  0.22**  0,05 
Service sector  ref.    ref.    ref.   ref.     17
  Higher wage 
same firm 
Higher wage  
new firm 
Low wage  
new firm 
Out of  
employment 
Labour force composition inside the firm           
Mean age  -0.14**  0.03  -0.07*  0.06  -0.15**  0.04  0.01  0,03 
Mean education level  0.07**  0.01  0.02  0.02  -0.06**  0.01  -0.03**  0,01 
Mean level of experience
#  -0.12**  0.04  -0.10*  0.07  0.20**  0.04  -0.29**  0,03 
Mean rate inside firms of:                 
 Women  -0.21**  0.06  -0.19*  0.10  0.38**  0.06  0.24**  0,05 
 Managers  0.40**  0.10  0.41**  0.17  0.05  0.12  0.38**  0,10 
 Low wage earners  -1.73**  0.09  -0.48**  0.13  0.30**  0.08  0.41**  0,06 
Unobserved heterogeneity terms               
vl  -4.73**  0.57  -5.72**  0.71  -4.29**  0.96  -4.30**  0.90 
Prob(vhs= vhn= vln= vo=0) 0.33**  0.00             
Note: * indicates parameter estimates significantly different from zero at a 10% level, ** indicates parameter 
estimates significantly different from zero at a 1% level. Standard deviations in italics. 
# Total labour market experience.  
 
Firm characteristics have previously been largely neglected except for variables like firm size 
and industry/sector (Stewart and Swaffield (1998) and Asplund et al. (1998)). Concerning the 
size of the firm Stewart and Swaffield (1998) find that low-wage employees in small U.K. firms 
(less than 25 employees) have a higher probability of being in low wage in the subsequent year. 
This is not in accordance with my result. I find that the probability of getting higher wage in the 
same firm is unaffected by the firm size, whereas the probability of getting higher wage in a new 
firm decreases with firm size. Thus, it seems as if smaller firms are better stepping-stones to 
better paid jobs at other firms, maybe because smaller firms provide more general on-the-job-
training, which is better exploited in jobs in other firms. However, when carrying out separate 
analyses by gender, I find that the effect of being employed in a small firm (<20 employees) 
differs significantly between males and females (Table 5.2). Thus, female employees in small 
firms have a higher probability of obtaining a higher wage, whereas for males the probability is 
lower. One plausible explanation for this result is that women are better at showing their worth 
at smaller firms, and thus they have a better chance of escaping low wage. Moreover, transitions 
to low wage in a new firm are more likely for women in small firms, while it is less likely for 
men in small firms. The transition out of employment is decreasing with firm size for both males 
and females.  
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Table 5.2. The competing risk hazard rate out of low-wage jobs divided by gender.  
  Higher wage 
same firm 
Low wage  
new firm 
Higher wage  
new firm 
Out of  
employment 
  Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Individual covariates  yes yes yes Yes yes Yes yes  yes 
Other firm covariates  yes  yes  yes  Yes yes  Yes  yes  yes 
< 20 employees   -0.08*  0.06  0.11** 0.04 -0.12*  0.07 0.11** 0.04 0.39** 0.09  0.45** 0.08  0.30** 0.07 0.25** 0.03
20-100 employees  0.01  0.05  0.04  0.04 -0.07  0.07 0.15** 0.04 0.23** 0.09  0.34** 0.08  0.21** 0.06 0.19** 0.03
100-500 employees  0.05  0.05  0.02  0.04 -0.22** 0.07 -0.11** 0.05 0.14*  0.10  0.12*  0.08  0.22** 0.07 0.10** 0.04
> 500 employees  ref.  ref.  ref.  ref.  ref.  ref.  ref.  ref. 
Mean rate inside firms of:                                 
  women  -0.32** 0.10  -0.13*  0.07 0.25*  0.13 0.34** 0.07 -0.14  0.16  0.00  0.14  -0.23*  0.11 0.39** 0.06
  high-level jobs  0.43** 0.17  0.40** 0.13 0.77** 0.22 0.01  0.15 0.71** 0.25  0.51*  0.25  0.62** 0.18 0.38** 0.12
  low-wage earners  -1.24** 0.14  -2.09** 0.11 0.14  0.16 0.40** 0.10 -0.47** 0.18  -0.68** 0.19  0.28** 0.11 0.45** 0.07
Note: * indicates parameter estimates significantly different from zero at a 10% level, ** indicates parameter 
estimates significantly different from zero at a 1% level. Standard deviations in italics. 
 
Table 5.3. The competing risk hazard rate out of low-wage jobs divided by education level.  
  Higher wage 
same firm 
Low wage  
new firm 
Higher wage  
new firm 



























Individual covariates  yes yes yes Yes yes yes  yes  yes 
Other firm covariates  yes  yes  yes  Yes yes  yes  yes  yes 
Mean age  -0.07*  0.05  -0.20** 0.05 -0.17** 0.05 -0.12** 0.05 -0.01  0.09  -0.12*  0.08  0.04  0.04 -0.01  0.04
Mean education level  0.03*  0.02  0.10** 0.02 -0.07** 0.02 -0.06** 0.02 -0.01  0.03  0.04*  0.03  -0.06** 0.01 -0.02  0.02
Avg. level of experience  -0.22** 0.06  -0.04  0.05 0.19** 0.06 0.22** 0.06 -0.21*  0.10  -0.09  0.09  -0.36** 0.04 -0.16** 0.05
Note: * indicates parameter estimates significantly different from zero at a 10% level, ** indicates parameter 
estimates significantly different from zero at a 1% level. Standard deviations in italics. 
 
 
In general, low-wage jobs in service-sector firms seem to be more persistent. On the other hand, 
low-wage earners in firms in the transport industry have high turnovers, i.e. high transitions to 
both low-wage jobs and high-wage jobs in new firms. Andersson et al. (2002) find that in the 
U.S. women have higher wage improvement probabilities in the service sectors, whereas men 
have higher wage increase probabilities in the traditional industries such as transports, 
manufacturing and trade. I find no gender differences in the industry effects (not shown). The 
highest transition rate to higher wage in the same firm is found in the financial sector, whereas 
the transport sector has the highest transition rate to higher wage in another firm. 
I now turn to the effect of the composition of the firm’s labour force. Average values of age, 
educational level and work experience, as well as frequency of women, managers and low-wage 
earners in each firm are calculated and included as explanatory variables in the regressions.    19
Higher education levels inside firms increase the transition to higher wage in the same firm and 
decrease the transition to low wage in a new firm and out of employment. It seems as if low-
wage employees in high-education firms tend to stay in the firm and climb the wage ladder. This 
effect is present for both low- and highly-educated low-wage workers (see Table 5.3). In 
contrast, the average level of work experience in the firm decreases the transition to higher wage 
inside the firm, but increases the transition to low wage at a new firm. This finding could be due 
to a harder competition within firms with a high average level of work experience among their 
employees. Thus, where high-education firms seem to provide better opportunities, high-
experience firms seem to provide worse opportunities for their low-wage employees. 
Ierulli et al. (2002), using Swedish data, find that the average age of the workforce affects the 
upward wage mobility negatively. This is well in accordance with the findings of the present 
paper, where the hazard rate out of a low-wage job decreases with the average age, especially for 
transitions to higher wage in the same firm and to low wage in a new firm. Looking at the low- 
and highly-educated groups separately, I find that these effects differ by educational level of the 
low-wage worker (Table 5.3). For a low-educated low-wage worker, the transition into higher 
wage is negatively affected by the average labour market experience of his co-workers, but not 
affected by his co-workers’ mean age. On the other hand, for a highly educated low-wage 
worker the transition into higher wage is negatively affected by the age of his co-workers, but 
not by the mean level of their work experience. Thus, low-educated workers seem to be more 
affected by the experience level of their co-workers, while highly-educated workers are more 
affected by their co-workers’ age. 
The higher the average proportion of women in the firm is, the lower are the transition 
probabilities to higher wage and the higher is the transition probabilities to low wage in a new 
firm and out of employment. Thus, not only being a woman but also having many women as 
colleagues have a negative impact on the chance of escaping low wage. The negative effect of 
the share of female co-workers on transitions to higher wage within the firm is present for both 
males and females, but the effect is stronger for males (see Table 5.2). Likewise, the share of 
women affects the transition to low wage in another firm positively for both males and females, 
and the effect is stronger for females. The negative effect on the transition to higher wage in a 
new firm disappears in the analysis by gender. Moreover, unlike low-wage women, low-wage 
men working in firms with a high share of women are less likely to leave employment. Thus,   20
males stay to a higher degree in their current low-wage job in firms with a high share of women, 
whereas females to a higher extent seem to leave these firms. 
The share of managerial level jobs inside the firm increases the transition to higher wage in the 
same firm and out of employment. Thus, firms with a high proportion of managers in general 
have a higher job turnover, transferring their low-wage employees either to higher wage or out 
of employment. Furthermore, firms with relatively many managerial employees seem to be 
better stepping-stones for higher wage jobs at other firms. 
Finally, we consider the importance of the proportion of low-wage earners in the firm. The 
higher the proportion is, the lower is the transition to higher wage in the same firm and the 
higher is the transition to a new firm and out of employment. Thus, low-wage earners in low-
wage firms obviously have a harder time moving up the income latter, not only within the 
current low-wage firm but also when moving to other firms, and according to the estimates it 
seems as if they leave employment instead. Consequently, low-wage jobs at low-wage firms are 
dead-end jobs in several senses: not only do they decrease the internal upward wage mobility, 
they also decrease the possibility to move to higher wages in other firms, and they increase the 
transitions out of employment and to other low-wage jobs.  
The empirical evidence presented above indicates that not only the characteristics of a low-wage 
worker but also the characteristics of the employing firm will affect the low-wage worker’s 
chances of escaping a low-wage job. In Table 5.4, this aspect is further described by calculations 
of the expected duration of a low-wage job for the same example individual in three different 
example firms. For simplicity, I have chosen only to let the three firms differ in four 
characteristics: size, industry, share of women and share of low-wage employees. The values of 
these variables are set to reflect three realistic firm types: a medium-large financial firm with an 
overweight of males and very few low-wage employees, a large service-sector firm with 75% 
female and half of the employees being low-wage earners and a small transportation firm with 
very few women and a high share of low-wage employees. The rest of the firm variables are set 
to their mean values for all three firms.  
The expected duration of the low-wage job varies between 3.4 years when the person is 
employed in firm 3, and 4.4 years when he is employed in firm 2.  However, the importance of 
the firm is even more pronounced when we look at the destination-specific hazard rates and the 
corresponding expected durations. Although the low-wage employee seems to have a better 
chance of escaping his low-wage job if he is employed in firm 3 compared to firm 1, the   21
destination-specific hazard rates indicate that his likelihood of actually moving to a high-wage 
job is lower in firm 3, due to a very low hazard rate to a high-wage job in the same firm.   
 
Table 5.4. Expected duration of a low-wage job for the same person in three different firms. 
   Firm 1
#  Firm 2
##  Firm 3
### 












All destinations  4.2 0.41 4.4 0.33 3.4 0.64
Destination-specific 
Same firm high wage  43.8 0.08 174.6 0.02 133.7 0.03
New firm high wage  67.7 0.06 154.4 0.03 48.6 0.08
New firm low wage  43.4 0.12 38.4 0.13 12.9 0.29
Out of employment  26.4 0.15 30.1 0.14 13.6 0.24
Note: Calculated using the parameter estimates from Table 5.1. 
# Firm 1:  101-500 employees, finance sector, share of women 0.35, share of low-wage employees 0.1. 
## Firm 2:  >500 employees, service sector, share of women 0.75, share of low-wage employees 0.5. 
### Firm 3:  4-20 employees, transport sector, share of women 0.15, share of low-wage employees 0.6. 
Identical characteristics for all three firms: local unemployment rate 6-10%, average work experience 6 years, 
average education level 11.4 years, mean age 34 years, share of managers 0.11. 
Example individual: male, aged 30-40, no small children, not married, work experience 5-10 years, education 
>10years, low-level job, previous labour market state: out of employment, unobserved low exit group. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Previous analyses of wage mobility among low-wage earners have almost exclusively focused 
on the characteristics of the low-wage earners, whilst the roles of firms and workplace 
characteristics have been largely neglected. The purpose of this study has been to consider both 
individual and firm characteristics in the analysis of wage mobility, and the empirical evidence 
indeed shows that the characteristics of the employing firm do matter for a low-wage employee’s 
likelihood of escaping a low-wage job. The employing firm does especially affect the destination 
state: where a low-wage worker goes after exiting a low-wage job. 
I began the analysis by examining low-wage firms, i.e. firms with a high rate of low-wage 
employees. These firms are characterized by a low average age, low levels of education and 
work experience among the employees, as well as a low share of managerial employees. These 
firms have relatively many women and employees on sick leave.  Furthermore, the typical low-
wage firm is a small or medium-sized firm (less than 100 employees) in the service or retail 
trade sector (including hotels and restaurants). Rather surprisingly, I find that low-wage firms 
typically have a low workforce turnover.   22
Concerning the wage mobility I find that individual, job and firm characteristics are all 
important in explaining the probability of exiting low-wage jobs. The linked employer-employee 
feature of the data makes it possible to distinguish between stayers and movers among 
individuals exiting a low-wage job spell.  
As for firm characteristics, I find that transitions from low wage to higher wage in the same firm 
are unaffected by the size of the firm, whereas transitions to higher wage in a new firm decrease 
with the size of the old firm. If small firms are more likely to provide general skills and large 
firms more likely to generate specific skills, the skills obtained at larger firms are less usable at 
other firms, and thus, the transition to higher wage in a new firm will be smaller for larger firms. 
Low-wage employees in service-sector firms were shown to be less likely to escape their current 
low-wage jobs, whereas low-wage workers in the financial sector have better chances especially 
if they stay in the same firm. Generally, low-wage employees in the transport sector have high 
transition rates out of their low-wage jobs, which also includes high transitions to new low-wage 
jobs at other firms and out of employment, so they might not actually escape low wage. 
Not only the characteristics of the low-wage worker but also the employing firms’ workforce 
composition were shown to affect the hazard rate out of low-wage jobs. Thus, for instance, the 
probability of escaping low wage within the firm increases with the average educational level of 
the firm’s labour force. The average level of work experience has, however, a negative impact. 
The transition out of a low-wage job was found to increase with the share of managerial 
personnel in the firm, except for transition to low wage in a new firm. Finally, I found that the 
chance of escaping low wage is decreasing with the share of low-wage workers in the firm. This 
is true not only within the firm, but also for moving to another firm. Moreover, the transitions 
out of employment are increasing with the share of low-wage workers, as well. Thus, low-wage 
jobs at low-wage firms seem to be truly dead-end jobs.    23
7. Appendix 
Table A.1. Mean value of explanatory variables for the selected sample. 
  Sample 
 Mean  St.d.
 
Age 25-30  0.25 0.43
Age 30-40  0.30 0.46
Age 40-50  0.24 0.43
Age > 50  0.20 0.40
Children aged 0-14  0.39 0.49
Experience <5 years  0.16 0.37
Experience 5-10 years  0.27 0.45
Experience > 10 years  0.56 0.50
Woman 0.64 0.48
Education <10 years  0.31 0.46
Education 10-12 years  0.22 0.41
Education >12 years  0.48 0.50
Low level job  0.55 0.50
Medium level job  0.32 0.47
High level job  0.06 0.24
Firm size  2175 5852
< 20 employees   0.30 0.46
20-100 employees  0.26 0.44
100-500 employees  0.18 0.38
> 500 employees  0.26 0.44




Service sector  0.05 0.22
Mean age  39.02 10.60
Mean level of experience  13.41 4.50
Mean education level  11.45 1.12
Rate of high level jobs  0.14 0.13
Rate of women  0.41 0.25
N (persons*years)  128,789
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